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I. INTRODUCTION
[1] In the twenty-first century, persons involved in the legal profession
will be forced to confront technological issues.
Computers and
technology have pervaded every aspect of society, and the legal system is
no exception. The discovery process is a dramatic example of how
lawyers and courts strain to keep up with technological advances.
Traditional discovery practices have been severely overhauled as
electronic information becomes increasingly prevalent. What was once a
simple discovery request can now become an overwhelming task, as
defendants must wade through a plethora of electronic documents in an
attempt to comply with the court’s discovery orders.
[2] As the legal system attempts to adjust to the effects of so-called “ediscovery,” both lawmakers and courts have made several attempts to
adjust and clarify such standards through both case law and proposed
changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. New laws must strike a
balance between reducing costs and burdens for producing parties, while
also giving them little ability to evade discovery requests by claiming they
are overburdened. The effectiveness of these changes is debatable, but the
generally trend indicates a movement toward relaxing the burden on
1
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defendants, leaving them increased opportunity to avoid document
production. In many cases, however, the outcome of litigation can turn on
a single incriminating e-mail buried among millions of electronic
documents.1 Computer-savvy defendants can take advantage of leeway in
the rules and make discoverable documents intentionally difficult to
discover by claiming undue burden. Rule makers should proceed with
caution when easing the burden on discoverable parties and attempt to
devise rules that will continue to give courts the ability to order document
production.
[3] In the past, the traditional paper discovery process has been relatively
simple. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate how much evidence
litigants must provide to opposing counsel. Complying with traditional
discovery requests typically involves sorting through paper files, which is
usually a manageable task. With the advent of computer technology,
however, companies and individuals are able to process information on a
scale never before anticipated. The use of computers to store information
and electronic mail to communicate presents huge challenges to the
discovery process. As computer technology becomes increasingly
advanced, challenges to the legal system will only become more
pronounced. This paper will explore the current standards used to cope
with these new challenges as well as proposed changes to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. It will also discuss the problems surrounding
the rules and standards and the potential effects on litigants and the
discovery process.
II.

THE IMPACT OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY ON THE DISCOVERY
PROCESS

[4] E-discovery is “the process of acquiring and presenting electronic
information in the discovery phase of litigation.”2 It is “the collection,
review, and production of electronically stored information – such as email, word processing documents, spreadsheets, and databases – in
accordance with state or federal discovery requirements.”3 Effective e1

See Generally Geanne Rosenberg, Electronic Discovery Proves an Effective Legal
Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1997, at D5.
2
Toby Brown, Electronic Discovery Basics, 52 R.I BAR J. 7, 7 (July/Aug. 2003).
3
Linda G. Sharp, Restoration Drama: The Complexity of Electronic Discovery Requires
Practitioners to Master New Litigation Skills, 28 L.A. LAW. 31, 31 (Oct. 2005).
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discovery both protects the integrity of information and allows that
information to be presented in depositions and court appearances.”4 Ediscovery has become “a mini-industry,” with the discovery process itself
increasingly affecting the outcome of litigation.5 Discovery requests now
include deleted information in addition to e-mail and word processing
documents.6 E-discovery is one of the most rapidly changing areas of the
law.7
[5] Computer technology now permeates all aspects of society and makes
life more efficient for people both in business and in their personal lives.
Computers serve as replacements for traditional modes of communication
and are involved in an increasing number of commercial transactions.
Consumer purchases made over the Internet were expected to increase
from $289 million in 1996 to $26 billion in 2001,8 and about 547.5 billion
e-mail messages were transmitted in the United States in 2003 alone.9
[6] Computers are also used to store records, which makes discovery a
daunting process. One hard drive can contain up to 1.5 million pages of
data, and one corporate backup tape can contain 4 million pages of data.10
It is possible to store more documents on a ten-square-inch hard drive than
can be kept as hard copies in an entire story of a building. 11 Adding to the
complexity of this situation is the fact that deleting a file on a computer
does not usually eliminate the file, but merely moves the file to a different
location on the hard drive. Additionally, many companies download and
store all of their system information, including deleted e-mails and
document drafts.12 The task of looking for one document among all active
and deleted files often becomes overwhelming and expensive. Litigators
undertake such a job with reluctance.
4

Brown, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis in original).
Rosenberg, supra note 1.
6
Brown, supra note 2, at 7.
7
Sharp, supra note 3, at 31.
8
Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation:
Is Rule 34 up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 328 (Mar. 2000).
9
Daniel B. Garrie & Matthew J. Armstrong, Electronic Discovery and the Challenge
Posed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2005 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 2, 4 (2005).
10
Sharp, supra note 3, at 31.
11
Rosenberg, supra note 1.
12
Rosenberg, supra note 1.
5
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[7] In many cases, a thorough search of the defendant’s electronic
documents can be well worth the trouble. In one example, a company was
convicted of stock fraud which was revealed in e-mails that were found
among 14,000 backup tapes of company e-mails stored in the warehouse.13
The company should have destroyed the data under their “document
retention” program, but their data system was “in disarray.”14 Another
well-known computer company was sanctioned for accidentally
destroying records and overlooking more than 44,000 boxes of documents
and backup tapes within nine months of a plaintiff’s document request.15
In another situation, a sexual harassment case was settled by a single
reference to an e-mail containing derogatory language directed at an
employee.16
[8] Electronic information played a crucial role in the outcome of many
well-known cases. During the Iran-contra scandal, investigators found
deleted incriminating communications exchanged among President
Reagan’s former national security advisers, Robert McFarlane and John
Poindexter, and Oliver North.17 During President Clinton’s impeachment
proceedings, Kenneth Starr and his legal team found a “talking points”
document in a computer file that Monica Lewinsky thought she had
deleted from her computer, forcing Lewinsky to accept an immunity
deal.18 Clearly, electronic information, no matter how seemingly old or
trivial, should not be overlooked.
III.

MAJOR PROBLEMS SURROUNDING E-DISCOVERY

[9] The nature of electronic information makes it extremely difficult to
discover.
Documents that were supposedly deleted may remain
retrievable and discoverable. Computer files contain metadata - data
retained within a document file that allows old or deleted data to be seen.19
In popular word processing software, users who have made changes to
13

Ashby Jones, What a Mess! For Corporations, Pileup of Electronic Data Could Be
Trouble Waiting to Happen, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 2, 2002, at C6.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 8, at 329.
17
Rosenberg, supra note 1.
18
Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 8, at 329.
19
Brown, supra note 2, at 8.
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files can see those changes by going to the file menu and selecting
properties.20 In legal documents, this may enable someone to view
confidential client information.21 E-discovery can be expensive because
specialists are often required to download and collate contents of hard
drives from personal computers that might be spread around the country,
and not stored in any particular order.22
[10] One of the biggest challenges companies face is producing backup
tapes for old computer files. Producing these backup tapes is an additional
burden. These tapes “must have the capacity to store large amounts of
information since they are relied upon to replace all the information
contained on a computer system after a crash.”23 It can cost hundreds of
thousands of dollars to search them.24 One of the biggest challenges for
litigants dealing with backup tapes is developing an understanding of the
company’s network infrastructure.25 Different companies have their own
unique network environments and their servers back up and store the tapes
over varying periods of time.26 Larger corporations usually have hundreds
or thousands of servers that can be backed up by a system of multiple
backup tapes.27
[11] The vast amount of data stored on backup tapes creates many
problems. Sometimes backup tape logs are not kept properly or the people
who kept them are no longer with the company.28 A company’s network
could also have gone through major changes during the time before the
information is sought.29 In addition to locating these tapes, one must also
“restore” them to see the data on them.30 Many companies no longer have

20

Id.
Id.
22
Mark Ballard, Digital Headache: E-discovery Costs Soar into the Millions, and
Litigants Seek Guidance, NAT’L L.J. Feb. 10, 2003, at A18.
23
Hagemeyer N. Am. Inc. v. Gateway Data Sci. Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 600 (E.D. Wis.
2004).
24
Id. at 601.
25
Sharp, supra note 2, at 33.
26
Id. at 33-34.
27
Id. at 34
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
21
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the hardware and software to read these tapes.31 The tapes may contain
legacy data, which is data created with applications that no longer exist on
the company’s servers.32 The data requested must be segregated from
everything else on the tape.33
[12] Companies must go to considerable expense to perform all of the
steps necessary to retrieve data, which often involves hiring or consulting
outside personnel to get the job done. According to the latest research,
most companies aren’t prepared to preserve and produce electronic
information when the time comes for them to do so. An American Bar
Association Annual Survey conducted in 2000 indicated that eighty-two
percent of clients had no established method for handling e-discovery
requests.34 Sixty percent of lawyers reported that in thirty to sixty percent
of their cases involving discovery, their clients were not aware that
electronic data could later become evidence in litigation.35
[13] The traditional discovery rules provide little guidance for creating an
ideal e-discovery protocol. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
designed during a time when information was almost always stored on
paper documents, and do not mention the possibility of information being
stored in electronic form. Rule thirty-four attempts to include electronic
information in its definition of “documents,” but does so awkwardly.36
Newly enacted laws do not take the burden of electronic information into
consideration. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act distinguishes public
companies from their private counterparts in mandating that public
companies must retain financial data to comply with the legislation.37
This means that there are no equitable judicial outcomes under the Act.38
The legal system is generally not prepared to handle the challenges of ediscovery, despite the profound effect it can have on litigation.
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Janet Ramsey, Technology and the Law: Zubulake V: Counsel’s Obligations to
Preserve and Produce Electronic Information, 84 MICH. BAR J. 26, 27 (Oct. 2005).
35
Id.
36
FED. R. CIV. P. 34; see also Scheindlin, supra note 8, at 331.
37
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
38
Garrie & Armstrong, supra note 9, at 4.
32
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[14] The most pressing question in most e-discovery cases is who should
bear the burden for the costly and time-consuming e-discovery process.
Many plaintiffs ask why they should be penalized because their corporate
opponents utilize systems that are efficient but do not preserve records
well.39 Lawyers for corporations and insurers generally support shifting
costs of discovery to the party making the request and providing a “safe
harbor” that protects companies who delete documents from their
computers. Under the laws of some countries, such as England, costs are
imposed on the side that does not prevail.40 Our system rejects this rule
because some parties may not be able to afford to comply. The question
remains whether plaintiffs should be punished because defendants chose
to utilize inexpensive systems that do not adequately archive electronic
records.41
IV.

CASE LAW’S COST SHIFTING STANDARDS
A.

THE FIRST JUDICIAL STANDARDS

[15] Several courts have attempted to articulate standards about when the
burden of electronic discovery shifts to the defendant. According to
Hagemeyer North America Inc. v. Gateway Data Science Corp., courts
developed four approaches to help determine when cost shifting is
proper.42 The Cost-benefit Analysis states that a requesting party always
bears burden of producing data that is computer generated.43 The
“Marginal Utility Approach” states that “the more likely it is that the
backup tape contains information that is relevant to a claim or defense, the
fairer it is that the [responding party] search at its own expense.”44 Two
subsequent cases articulated the final two approaches for determining who
should bear the burden of discovery. Rowe Entertainment Inc. v. The
39

Ballard, supra note 22.
Id.
41
Id.
42
Hagemeyer N. Am. Inc. v. Gateway Data Science Corp., 222 F.R.D. 594, 601 (E.D.
Wis. 2004) (citing Stephen D. Williger & Robin M. Wilson, Negotiating the Minefields
of Electronic Discovery, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH 52, at ¶¶ 13-25 (2004)).
43
Hagemeyer, 222 F.R.D. at 602 (citing Marnie H. Pulver, Electronic Media Discovery:
The Economic Benefit of Pay-Per-View, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1379 (2000)).
44
Id. (citing McPeek v. Ashcroft, 202 F.R.D. 31, 34 (D.D.C. 2001)).
40
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William Morris Agency, Inc.45 and Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC46
utilized multi-prong tests, shifting the standard closer to the
proportionality test of Rule 26(b)(2), and making analysis dependant on
the facts of each case.47
[16] Courts have traditionally appreciated the value of allowing plaintiffs
to easily procure the information they need. For example, in OPENTV v.
Liberate Technologies,48 the court stated that “shifting the cost of
production from the producing party to the requesting party should be
considered only when inaccessible data is sought.”49 “Accessibility,” the
court opined, “turns largely on the expense of production.”50 In Rowe
Entertainment, the court stated that “too often, discovery is not just about
uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can
afford to disinter. . . . [D]iscovery expenses frequently escalate when
information is stored in electronic form.”51 The court also stated that for
purposes of litigation, “electronic documents are just as discoverable as
paper documents.”52 The court astutely pointed out that if any of the
defendants are engaged in illicit practices, “it is less likely that
communications about such activities would be memorialized in an easily
accessible form such as a filed paper document.”53
[17] The Rowe Entertainment court presumed that the responding party
must bear expense of complying with discovery requests.54 Nevertheless,
the court said that it had the ability to protect the responding party from
“undue burden or expense” by shifting some or all costs to the requesting
party.55 The court then came up with eight factors used to determine
whether the cost should be shifted to the requesting party.56 The
45

Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
47
Hagemeyer, 222 F.R.D. at 603.
48
OPENTV v. Liberate Tech., 219 F.R.D. 474 (N.D. Ca. 2003).
49
Id. at 476.
50
Id. at 476-77.
51
Rowe Entm’t. 205 F.R.D. at 423.
52
Id. at 428.
53
Id.
54
Id. (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359 (1978)).
55
Id. at 428 (citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(c)).
56
These included (1) the specificity of requests, (the less specific the requesting party’s
discovery demands, the more appropriate it is to shift the costs of production to that
46
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plaintiff’s counsel were ultimately ordered to “formulate a search
procedure for identifying responsive e-mails and . . . notify each
defendant’s counsel of the procedure chosen, including any specific word
searches.”57
B.

THE SEVEN-PART ZUBULAKE TEST

[18] Zubulake v. Warburg set the standard for how courts approach the
burden of e-discovery. The court favored a broad approach to the
discoverability of data. It stated that “[i]n the world of electronic data . . .
any data that is retained in a machine readable format is typically
accessible.”58 It went on to say that “broad discovery is a cornerstone of
the litigation process contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”59 In this case, plaintiff Zubulake sued her former employer
for gender discrimination. She requested discovery of “all documents
concerning any communication by or between UBS employees concerning
Plaintiff . . . including, without limitation, electronic or computerized data
compilations.”60 UBS utilized a complicated back-up process that made it
difficult to retrieve old e-mails and other types of electronic documents.
[19] The court stated that cost shifting should only be considered when ediscovery imposes an “undue burden or expense” on the responding
party.61 Consideration depends on whether the data is kept in an
party.) (2) the likelihood of a successful search, (3) the availability from other sources,
(sometimes information is made available or is accessible in a different format at less
expense.) (4) the purpose of retention, (if a party retains electronic data because it
currently uses it, it must respond to the discovery request at its own expense.) (5) the
benefit to the parties, (if the responding party benefits for some reason, there isn’t much
reason to shift the burden to the requesting party.) (6) the total cost, (if the cost is not
substantial, there is no reason to deviate from the presumption that the responding party
will bear the expense.) (7) the ability to control costs, (“Where the discovery process is
going to be incremental, it is more efficient to place the burden on the party that will
decide how expansive the discovery will be.”) and (8) the parties’ resources (The cost of
discovery might be too much for one of the parties, so it would make sense to shift the
burden to the other). Id. at 429-32.
57
Id. at 433.
58
Zubulake, 217 F.R.D. at 318.
59
Id. at 311 (quoting Jones v. Goord, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8707, No. 95 Civ. 8026,
2002 WL 1007614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y 2002)).
60
Id. at 313.
61
Id. at 318.
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accessible or inaccessible format. Data is accessible when it is “readily
available in a usable format and reasonably indexed.”62 Inaccessible data
included backup tapes and “erased, fragmented, or damaged data.”63 The
court went on to enumerate five categories of data listed from most to least
accessible, the first three of which are considered discoverable.64
[20] The court in Zubulake criticized the Rowe test for not taking into
account the “amount in controversy or the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation.”65 They also recommended that courts consider the
total cost of the proposed discovery as well as the cost of production
compared to the “amount in controversy.”66 The Zubulake court
eliminated two prongs of the Rowe test, and came up with a new test
comprised of seven factors.67 In doing so, the court emphasized that the
purpose behind the responding party’s maintenance of the requested
information is usually not important.68
62

Id. at 318.
Id.
64
These were (1) active, online data, (2) near-line data, typically consisting of “a robotic
storage device (robotic library) that houses removable media, uses robotic arms to access
the media, and uses multiple read/write devices to store and retrieve records.” (3) Offline
storage/archives, often consisting of a removable disk or magnetic tape media that can be
labeled or stored in a shelf or rack, (4) Backup tapes, which are devices “like a tape
recorder, that reads from and writes data onto a tape, that have capacities of anywhere
from a few hundred kilobytes to several gigabytes,” (5) Erased, fragmented or damaged
data.64 When files are erased, their clusters are made available again as free space.
Eventually some newly created files become larger than the remaining contiguous free
space. These files are then broken up and randomly placed throughout the disk. Such
broken-up files are said to be “fragmented,” and along with damaged and erased data can
only be accessed after significant processing.” Id.
65
Id. at 321.
66
Id. at 323.
67
Id. at 322. The seven factors included:
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant
information
2. The availability of such information from other sources
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each party
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and
7. The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the information.
Id.
68
Id. at 322 (quotations omitted).
63
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[21] The seven factors should not necessarily be weighted equally, and
should only serve as guidance in deciding whether a discovery request
imposes an “undue burden or expense on the responding party,” and “how
important [the] evidence [is] in comparison to the cost of production.”69
The court stated that the individual circumstances of each case should be
taken into account, and that a factual basis is required to support the
analysis.70 To perform this test, litigants and courts must familiarize
themselves with the responding party’s computer system, both with
respect to active and stored data.71 Because cost-shifting analysis is so
fact-intensive, it is necessary to determine what data can be found on the
inaccessible media.72 Although this poses significant challenges for all
parties involved, it may help each party access crucial information.
C.

IMPACT OF THE ZUBULAKE TEST

[22] The Zubulake test obligated parties and their lawyers to make every
effort possible to comply with discovery requests. It addresses not only a
party’s obligations to preserve and produce electronic information, but
also the obligations of their counsel.73 Counsel has an obligation under
Zubulake to find all sources of information that may be relevant to the
case. To do this, lawyers must become educated about their client’s
document retention policies and data retention system. This requires
attorneys to communicate with the client’s information technology staff
who can explain concepts such as “system-wide backup procedures and
the actual (as opposed to theoretical) implementation of the firm’s
recycling policy.”74 It is counsel’s responsibility not just to tell the client
that they have to retain and produce all information relevant to the case,
but also to follow up with the client and continuously remind them of what
they are required to do. Under Zubulake, counsel’s obligation is to find
and preserve all sources of potentially relevant information, whether in
paper or electronic form. Clients must be aware of all duties to preserve
information, “whether imposed by litigation or state or federal
69

Id.
Id. at 323.
71
Id. at 324.
72
Id.
73
Ramsey, supra note 34, at 28.
74
Id.
70
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regulation.”75 Until the client begins to realize the impact of technology in
litigation, the lawyer must educate them to provide the best service and
avoid sanctions litigation that could be damaging.76
[23] The Zubulake test has generally been followed and respected by
courts over the past two years. However, some courts have rejected the
Zubulake cost-shifting test. The first case to do this was Toshiba Am.
Elec. Components, Inc. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County.77 The
plaintiffs in the Toshiba case had requested more than 800 million backup
tapes that would cost $1.5 million to $1.9 million to restore. The court
held that plaintiffs should pay because “[o]ur Legislature has identified the
expense of translating data compilations into usable form as one that, in
the public’s interest, should be placed upon the demanding party.”78 As a
increasing number of courts grapple with the issues of cost shifting in ediscovery cases, it is likely that the Zubulake decision will continue to be
questioned, and less onerous and expensive alternatives explored.
V.

DISCOVERY RULES AND PROPOSED CHANGES: AN EFFECTIVE
SOLUTION?

[24] The rules of discovery have been subject to constant change even
before the issue of e-discovery arose. According to some, “[t]he Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure change with the telephone directory. Every year,
something is tweaked, torn, wrenched or rewritten. Most of this is merely
annoying. Sometimes, though, buried amid the clutter is an amendment
that caries a real wallop for major aspects of practice.”79
The rules for discovery, Rules 26 through 37, generally provide
little guidance about discovery of electronic information or shifting
extremely costly burdens between parties. Rule 26(b)(1) states that
“[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that
is relevant to the claim or defense of any party . . . .”80 These rules allow a
75

Id.
Id. at 29.
77
124 Cal. App. 4th 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
78
Toshiba, 124 Cal. App. 4th at 772.
79
Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to EDiscovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 18 (2004).
80
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
76
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court to limit the scope of discovery if it finds either that the discovery
request is more easily obtained from another source (including
information already collected), or the requesting party has had sufficient
opportunity to obtain discovery, or the request is unduly burdensome or
expensive.81 Rule 26(b)(2)(iii) provides 5 factors that helps courts decide
whether the burden or discovery request is overly burdensome; these
include the specific requirements of the case, the amount in controversy,
the resources of each party, the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the
issues.82
[25] Many legal experts have agreed for some time that the prevalence of
electronic evidence called for major changes to the discovery rules.
According to one commentator, “[R]ules amendments are necessary now
because, without Rules amendments, corporate defendants and the defense
bar will continue to lack a clear sense of how to treat electronic evidence
and what to do with it in civil discovery.”83 As early as 1997, the
Discovery Subcommittee convened in a series of meetings with practicing
lawyers to get their opinions about what changes to the Federal Rules
would be useful, and e-discovery was a topic which arose frequently. In
September of 2002, Professor Richard L. Marcus, Advisor and special
consultant to Advisory Committee and Discovery Subcommittee, sent
letter and memo to 250 “E-discovery Enthusiasts” seeking suggestions
about developing proposals to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to “address special features of discovery of electronic, or computer-based
information.”84 The Committee also considered work of the Sedona
Conference Working Group on Electronic Document Production, a group
of attorneys and others who specialize in electronic discovery matters,
concerning whether the rules developed for paper discovery would be
adequate.85 This group drafted an article entitled Sedona Principles: Best
Practices Recommendations and Principles for Addressing Electronic
81

Id.
Id.
83
BALLARD, supra note 22, at A18 (quoting Rex K. Linder, president of Lawyers for
Civil Justice, association for corporate and defense counsel).
84
Henry S. Noyes, Is E-Discovery so Different that it Requires New Discovery Rules?
An Analysis of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 71 TENN.
L. REV. 585, 591 (2004).
85
Id.
82
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Document Production in which they set out a list of fourteen
recommendations and principles.86 In 2003, the Discovery Subcommittee
met to come up with new language for the rules and presented the
proposed rule language to the U.S. Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee for discussion.87 In 2004, they recommended a “package of
proposals aimed at discovery of electronically stored information” for
publication and comment.88 The amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were approved by Standing Committee on the Federal
Rules in June of 2005, and the Judicial Conference in September of 2005,
and, with Supreme Court approval and without congressional intervention,
the proposed rules will take effect on December 1, 2006.89
A.

PROPOSED RULE 26 REVISIONS

[26] The new rule changes generally favor a departure from the traditional
standard of broad-based discovery. The rules take the cost and burden of
production into account at the expense of thorough discovery. Rules 26
and 34 will soon be revised to say that that “electronically stored
information that is not reasonably accessible is discoverable only upon a
showing of good cause.”90 They also establish that a “party need not
provide discovery of electronically stored information that the party
identifies as not reasonably accessible,” but rather “[o]n motion by the
requesting party, the responding party must show that the information
sought is not reasonably accessible. If that showing is made, the court
may order discovery of the information for good cause and may specify
terms and conditions for such discovery.”91 Whether information is
reasonably accessible should be determined on a case-by-case basis.92

86

Id.
Id.
88
Id. at 593.
89
Lloyd S. Van OostenRijk, Paper or Plastic? Electronic Discovery and Spoliation in
the Digital Age, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1163, 1169 (2005).
90
Noyes, supra note 84, at 634 (citations omitted).
91
Id. (citations omitted).
92
Id.
87
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[27] Amendments of Rule 26(b)(2)(B) and (C) call for a “two-tiered
process” for electronic discovery.93 In the first tier, responding parties
must produce all relevant accessible data from data storage systems and
description and location of all relevant data that is not “reasonably
accessible” on their systems.94 If the data is not reasonably accessible, it
is considered to be outside the scope of discovery unless the producing
party can show “good cause,” a standard that is only ambiguously
defined.95 In the second tier, or stage of the discovery process, when the
party requesting information shows “good cause,” the court can hear
arguments from both sides and weigh the cost of producing documents
against needs of the party requesting. Even if the requesting party agrees
to pay for the discovery, the court can still rule against it if the producing
party’s burden to review information for relevance and privilege is greater
than the need.96
[28] The changes to Rule 37(f) eliminate the possibility of judicial
sanctions when parties evade discovery requests. The Rule allows
sanctions only when there are “exceptional circumstances for data lost
because of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system.”97 Under the new regime, parties will no longer have to fear court
sanctions or a demand to produce relevant, non-privileged materials, but
rather may be allowed to destroy potentially incriminating documents
using a document retention policy. Ideally, the rules help facilitate
discovery requests, and mitigate mounting discovery costs due to the
expense of electronic storage devices as well as an increase in the amount
93

One of the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
26(b)(2)(B), states that a party need not provide discovery of electronically stored
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of
undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery
from such sources if the requesting party shows good cause, considering the limitations
of Rule 26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery. See Daniel B.
Garrie et al., Hiding the Inaccessible Truth: Amending the Federal Rules to
Accommodate Electronic Discovery, 25 REV. LITIG. 115, 115 (2006) (referencing
Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, app. C, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf
(September 2005)).
94
Id.
95
Garrie, et al., supra note 93 at 116.
96
Id. at 117.
97
Id. (citations omitted).
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of digitally stored data.98 In application, however, the rules are biased in
favor of big companies with a greater document pool who would
otherwise have to use considerable resources for electronic document
retrieval and review. This cost implicitly encourages them to make their
electronic document storage system as inaccessible as possible.
B.

DRAWBACKS OF THE PROPOSED RULES

[29] While the changes to the rules are cost-effective for parties faced
with discovery, they also provide defendants with more ways to avoid
complying with discovery requests. Litigants can abuse the discovery
process through the destruction or concealment of incriminating evidence.
Software engineers and programmers can intentionally design storage
facilities for software that are purposefully inaccessible by making data
access financially or technically impractical. This would relieve them of
the burden to produce. To accomplish this, a corporation may make it too
difficult or expensive to search for or restore data, or change the data’s
format. They could also try to evade the 2-tiered discovery process by
failing to disclose enough information about data “categories, descriptors,
or designs” that contain accessible or inaccessible material data stored on
their computer systems.99 Also, some “may frustrate the doctrine of broad
discovery by shifting costs to requesting parties, forcing them” to go
through many rounds of highly technical discovery battles.100
[30] Two of the rules proposed at the Committee’s most recent meeting in
September of 2005 give producing parties two potential options to evade
certain discovery requests. Proposed Rule 26(b)(2)(B), in particular, gives
parties the ability to determine data’s accessibility and, therefore, their
own production responsibilities.101 The Rule does not define “not
98

Id. at 118.
Id. at 119 (reducing producing parties’ costs while increasing requesting parties’ costs
by using a “needle in a haystack” approach where requesting parties would have to first
compel sample document production from producing parties’ systems, and if that looked
good, request more).
100
Id.
101
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information
from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible
because of undue burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or
for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is sought must
show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of
99
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reasonably accessible” adequately, and parties can easily claim that their
data is not accessible for technical or monetary reasons. The Zubulake
court named five categories of data storage systems, two of which were
considered inaccessible. Under the rule change, however, even data stored
in the so-called accessible categories may be considered inaccessible
because of undue burden or cost. Courts do not often possess the technical
expertise to discern when a party might be bluffing by claiming that
accessing data is too costly or burdensome. The producing party itself
provides the initial assessment of whether the data is accessible.102 A
company might deliberately set up a complicated mainframe access to data
which would not be easily accessible for the opposing party. In such a
case, plaintiffs would need to have the same expensive mainframe system
to view the data and would have to pay a great deal for access to people
and technology that could get, convert, and deliver data to the requesting
party. The Rule encourages companies who are asked to produce to invest
in “digital document storage systems” that allow them to say their data is
not reasonably accessible even when it is.103
[31] The “good cause” requirement of the second part of Rule 26(b)(2)(B)
allows a court to order discovery of inaccessible information, but this
requirement is not well defined. In addition, if a producing party fails to
disclose the existence of certain documents, a discovering party will not
know they exist, making it hard to show good cause to compel production.
In “situations where certain electronic documents are especially
incriminating, litigants may be able to mischaracterize, re-characterize, or
refrain from disclosing the existence of their data,” making an efficient
discovery process nearly impossible for the requesting parties.104

undue burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may
nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the requesting party
shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule 26(b)(2)(C).
The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
(Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Report to the Judicial Conference, app. C45-46 (May 27,
2005, as revised July 25, 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf.
102
Garrie et al., supra note 93, at 124.
103
Id. at 125.
104
Id. at 126.
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[32] The new proposed Rule 37(f) also allows defendants room to evade
certain discovery requirements. The Rule proposes that “[a]bsent
exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these
rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost
as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system.”105 In other words, there will be no sanctions for losing
documents unless there was reckless operation of a document retention or
deletion policy. This rule is a “sharp divergence” from the current Federal
Rules and common law that prevents “parties from destroying documents
under a document retention policy once they know or should have known
the data is likely to be requested in litigation.”106
[33] Parties to litigation are enabled by these rules to circumvent requests
for electronic discovery by “proactively deleting entire subsets of
potentially harmful data before they have notice that the documents are
likely to be requested in discovery.”107 Modern technology lets companies
design “e-document storage systems that are able to proactively screen and
delete documents that tend to incriminate a company or subject it to civil
liability,” like objectionable e-mails.108 Litigants can delete certain types
of electronic files, like e-mail, and face no liability so long as they have no
reason to know that plaintiffs would want to request any specific emails.109
[34] The combined effect of proposed Rules 26(b)(2)(B) and 37(f) is that
companies can get the “benefits of a data deletion policy” without actually
deleting anything.110 Although these new rules will help corporate
defendants get through the litigation process without incurring a great deal
of expense, it will also allow them more room to conceal important files
and electronic documents. In the future, technically savvy defendants will
have a distinct advantage in evading discovery of potentially damaging
documents. In many cases, this could change the entire outcome of the
litigation.
105

Id.
Id. at 127.
107
Id. at 128.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 128-29.
110
Id. at 130.
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CONCLUSION

[35] Discovery is an important phase of litigation, and the newly
proposed electronic discovery rules will dilute its effectiveness. The new
rules will give large organizational defendants a huge advantage over their
opponents. The rules will cater to such defendants by giving them ample
room to evade discovery by claiming that pertinent documents are not
accessible. In addition, courts and lawyers are not often technical experts
and will not always be aware of defendants’ capabilities to purposely
evade discovery.
[36] Defendants should not be able to escape liability through discovery
so easily. Recent litigation such as the Lewinsky111 and Enron112 cases
discussed above reveals that incriminating evidence can often be found in
one document out of millions. Additionally, the Enron scandal has shown
that corporate wrongdoing can have a huge affect on the lives of many
people, including employees, the local community, and the economy as a
whole. Large organizations such as these should not be allowed to escape
liability by burying crucial documents among supposedly inaccessible
computer files.
[37] Although the results of litigation are not always so dramatic, no
organization of any kind should be able to get away with wrongdoing.
Lawmakers should retain a broad approach when devising the rules for
electronic discovery. Additionally, courts and attorneys should familiarize
themselves with technological issues. Otherwise, the validity of the
litigation process will be severely threatened.
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Rabkin, supra note 8, at 329 (citing Gregory Whitehair & Kimberly Koontz,
Discoverability of Electronic Data, COLO. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 45. See State Prosecutor
v. Judicial Watch, Inc. 356 Md. 118 (Md. 1999).
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See In re Enron, 274 B.R. 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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